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Abstract: We characterize equilibrium payoffs of a delegated common agency
game in a public good context where principals use smooth contribution sched-
ules. We prove that under complete information, payoff vectors of equilibria
with truthful schedules coincide with the set of smooth equilibrium payoffs,
including non-truthful schedules. We next consider whether the presence of
arbitrarily small amounts of asymmetric information is enough to refine this
payoff set. Providing that the extensions of the equilibrium schedules beyond
the equilibrium point are flatter than truthful schedules, the set of equilib-
rium payoffs is strictly smaller than the set of smooth (equivalently, truthful)
equilibrium payoffs. Interestingly, some forms of asymmetric information do
not sufficiently constrain the slopes of the extensions and fail to refine the
payoff set. In the case of a uniform distribution of types and arbitrary out-
of-equilibrium contributions, the refinement has no bite. If, however, one re-
stricts out-of-equilibrium behavior in a natural way, the refinement is effective.
Alternatively, we may consider an exponential distribution with unbounded
support (and hence no out-of-equilibrium choices) and we find that the refine-
ment selects a unique equilibrium payoff vector equal to Lindahl prices.
As a separate contribution, equilibria with forcing contracts are also considered
both under complete and asymmetric information.
1Toulouse School of Economics and EHESS.
2University of Chicago, Graduate School of Business.
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1 Introduction
In a public good common-agency game, several principals non-cooperatively design pay-
ment schedules for a common agent who chooses the level of a public good. Under
complete information, Bernheim and Whinston [1] argued that one should focus on the
class of truthful Nash equilibria of such games. In those equilibria, each principal offers a
contribution schedule which reflects his own marginal preferences for the decision taken
by the agent. Truthful Nash equilibria are attractive for several reasons. First, they
yield an efficient outcome. Since his marginal contribution reflects a principal’s marginal
preferences, the agent is made residual claimant for the surplus of the grand-coalition
he forms with all principals. The multiplicity of equilibria, if any, comes from the pos-
sibility to sustain different payoff distributions. Second, truthful equilibria are generally
coalition-proof; that is, the equilibria are immune to deviations by coalitions of principals,
which would themselves also be robust to further deviations by subcoalitions, and so on.1
Finally, truthful Nash equilibria have been found attractive in applied research since the
distribution of truthful payoffs is easily characterized by means of simple inequalities.2
Although truthful contributions schedules have attractive properties, their use raises
two sets of issues. First, one may wonder which minimal properties of contribution sched-
ules really ensure that efficiency is achieved in equilibrium. In other words, can we find
other equilibrium schedules (for instance by specifying other out-of-equilibrium exten-
sions that are not globally truthful or by considering non-differentiable schedules) and
still maintain efficiency? What is the impact of alternative choices of extensions for the
characterization of the principals’ payoffs? Second, given that the choice of extensions
might have a significant impact on the distribution of equilibrium payoffs, can we find
any rationale for relying on some particular extensions and what are the consequences?
This paper addresses these two sets of questions. In section 3, we address the first issue
and show that the differentiability of the schedules at the equilibrium point is enough to
ensure efficiency. We fully describe the set of equilibria allocations when the principals
and their agent’s optimal choices are characterized with first-order conditions. All such
equilibria have the property that the principals’ marginal contributions at the equilibrium
point reflect their marginal valuations, i.e., a requirement of local truthfulness is satisfied.
Even though the schedules that support the efficient outcome may differ out of equi-
librium, the set of equilibrium payoffs remains the same as those achievable in truthful
1This property is hardly surprising given the fact that any such subcoalition turns out to jointly offer
a schedule reflecting the aggregate preferences of the coalition.
2Indeed, because truthful contributions not only reflect the principals’ preferences at the equilibrium
output but also for any out-of-equilibrium one, it becomes easy to compute the agent’s reservation payoffs
when he deals only with a subset of principals. Those reservation payoffs determine in turn how much
can be extracted by any principal, and thus his equilibrium payoff. Laussel and Lebreton [5, 6].
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equilibria. In all cases, a principal gets at most his incremental contribution to welfare
and at least his stand-alone payoff.
The set of principals payoffs in smooth equilibria is generally quite large. In appli-
cations, we often want to predict the particular payoff vector that emerges, particularly
when the common agency game is part of a larger game with prior stages of investments
or other costly actions. To this end, for the remainder of the paper, we turn our attention
to a simple class of asymmetric-information refinements. The motivation for this form of
refinement is that in many real-world settings the principals are offering nonlinear con-
tribution schedules because they are attempting to extract surplus from (or otherwise to
provide incentives to) the agent. In particular, it is well-known from the incentive litera-
ture in monopolistic screening environments in which the agent has private information,
that nonlinear schedules serve an important role in extracting surplus. With this com-
peting use of nonlinear schedules as our backdrop, we can characterize the equilibrium
contribution schedules and payoff vectors for some distribution of agent type. In such a
game with competing principals, the requirement of truthfulness is no longer imposed a
priori but is instead replaced by the more natural incentive compatibility constraint of
the agent at any equilibrium point.3 Then, taking the limit as the support of the agent’s
private information converges to a point mass, we can ask what is the limiting set of
payoffs to the players. If the limit payoff set is strictly smaller than the set of all smooth-
equilibrium payoffs under complete information, we have a refinement that potentially
has desirable properties and predictive appeal.
In section 4 we solve for the differentiable equilibria of the delegated common agency
game when the agent is privately informed on the cost of producing the public good
and both principals can contract on the same screening variable.4 This analysis is of
independent value for readers interested in common agency games under adverse selection
with common screening devices. Second, we investigate the limit of equilibrium payoffs
and strategies as the types distribution converges towards a mass point. We demonstrate
that the limit set of equilibrium payoffs under asymmetric information when the support
of the distribution (supposed to be uniform) converges to a mass point corresponds to
the set of smooth (equivalently, truthful) equilibrium payoffs. Asymmetric information
alone does not refine the complete-information equilibrium payoffs set because in the case
of the uniform distribution it fails to impose sufficient constraints on out-of-equilibrium
contributions. There is still much latitude in selecting out-of-equilibrium contributions
while maintaining the efficient outcome in the limit. This points to the source of the
refinement failure.
3For a similar discussion, see Martimort and Stole [9].
4This is distinct from the analysis of Martimort and Stole [10] in which principals are restricted to
writing contracts on mutually exclusive subsets of the screening variables.
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To select among equilibrium payoffs, asymmetric information must provide a rationale
for focusing on differentiable equilibrium schedules which are less steep than truthful
strategies, and this degree of curvature must be preserved when the types distribution
converges towards a Dirac mass. Flatter schedules constrain the set of equilibrium payoffs.
In this respect, there are two strategies for removing the large degrees of freedom inherent
in the uniform distribution case. First, we can directly refine the out-of-equilibrium
contributions in the asymmetric game while maintaining our assumption of a uniform
distribution. Second, we can turn our attention to a type distribution that is unbounded
(and hence leaves nothing out-of-equilibrium). We consider each in section 6.
In section 6.1, we focus on a reasonable restriction to out of equilibrium contributions
when types are uniformly distributed. We require simply that the out-of-equilibrium
schedules are extensions of the equilibrium schedules using the same analytical expression.
This quite natural extension allows an easy computation of the agent’s reservation payoffs
when refusing one of the principal’s contracts.5 We obtain thereby the so-called natural-
extension equilibria and the corresponding distributions of equilibrium payoffs.6
To understand how natural extensions help select among equilibrium outcomes it is
useful to review the logic underlying asymmetric information distortions and how those
distortions affect payoffs. Under adverse selection, each principal attempts to extract rent
from the privately-informed agent taking as given the other principal’s contribution. To
reduce the agent’s information rent, each principal reduces his own marginal contribution
to reduce the agent’s output. The principals’ marginal contributions no longer reflect
their marginal valuations as with truthful schedules but are strictly lower for screening
purposes. This screening effect causes naturally-extended contribution schedules to be
flatter than truthful schedules. Consider now the case where the support of the type
distribution shrinks to zero. Even in the limit, natural schedules keep track of the rent-
extraction externality which arises under adverse selection and remain flatter than truthful
schedules. The set of natural equilibrium payoffs when the support of the adverse selection
parameter shrinks becomes a strict subset of the set of truthful payoffs of the complete
information game.
Pushing this logic to the extreme, a very powerful selection device can be obtained if
we were able to find an asymmetric information game with equilibrium schedules being
almost linear. In section 6.2, we obtain this equilibrium by having types exponentially
distributed and assuming symmetric payoffs for the principals. Adding some mild tech-
nical conditions, there exists a unique equilibrium of the asymmetric information game.
5In this respect, natural extensions preserve the tractability offered by truthful schedules.
6These equilibria are quite robust. Enlarging the support of the uniform distribution of types would
indeed keep the principals’ marginal contributions unchanged. The fixed-fees in the equilibrium contri-
butions are derived from the condition that the least efficient type’s information rent is fully extracted.
Hence, those fixed-fees change as the support is modified.
4
As the exponential distribution converges towards a Dirac mass, there always remains a
positive, albeit small, probability that any positive output below the first-best may arise
in equilibrium. This eliminates any freedom in choosing extensions and is enough to have
a unique equilibrium under asymmetric information. This equilibrium is such that con-
tribution schedules are almost linear. It converges towards the Lindahl outcome of the
complete information game as the type distribution converges towards a Dirac mass. This
provides a powerful refinement of the set of all smooth, efficient equilibria in the common
agency game.
The analysis for most of the paper is restricted to the class of continuous, weakly
increasing contribution schedules that are differentiable everywhere except at possibly the
highest output for which a principal’s transfer is zero. There is another class of equilibria,
however, based with forcing contracts that are not differentiable. Truthful equilibria have
been criticized by Kirchsteiger and Prat [3] who ran experiments to confirm that simple
forcing contracts may be quite attractive. For these reasons we extend our analysis to
the class of non-differentiable forcing contracts in section 7. Here, we characterize the
set of forcing equilibria which we hope is of independent interest to those doing applied
work. Although inefficient outcomes may now be sustained in equilibrium, any equilibrium
outcome under complete information achieved with forcing contracts is also the limit of
equilibrium outcomes of the game under asymmetric information. This confirms again
that asymmetric information has little power as a selection device unless the modeler is
ready to focus on differentiable schedules and make an argument to use schedules in the
asymmetric information game which are “flat enough.”
Let us now review the relevant literature. In the framework of private common agency
that differs from our public common agency game, Chiesa and Denicolo [2] describe the
whole set of payoffs achieved under complete information, showing that truthful strategies
are not necessarily very attractive. Laussel and Lebreton [5] have instead rationalized the
use of truthful schedules by introducing uncertainty on the agent’s cost function with a
finite support for the cost parameter and ex ante contracting. One issue there is that
contributions may be negative for some realizations. This makes it hard to enforce con-
tributions ex post, once the agent has learned about his cost. Accordingly, we consider
adverse selection and ex post contracting so that negative transfers can always be rejected
by the privately informed agent. With that alternative timing, non-cooperating principals
exert on each other a contractual externality which modifies their contributions away from
truthfulness. Martimort and Moreira [7] replace truthfulness by an incentive compatibil-
ity constraint in a model where principals are instead privately informed. Finally, our
paper is also related to Klemperer and Meyer [4]’s analysis of equilibria with supply func-
tions. Those authors introduced uncertainty on demand to select among those equilibria.
Although the complete information game analyzed below has also multiple equilibria, our
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paper differs from theirs along several lines, most noticeably the strategic play of the
common agent and our focus on adverse selection instead of ex ante uncertainty.
2 The Model
Consider two principals (i = 1, 2) whose utility functions are respectively given by Vi(q, ti) =
Si(q) − ti where ti is the monetary transfer made to a common agent. This agent pro-
duces q units of public good on the principals’ behalf at cost θq, and gets a payoff
U(q, t1 + t2) = t1 + t2 − θq of doing so. We assume that Si(·) is strictly increasing,
concave and satisfies the Inada conditions S ′i(0) = +∞, S ′i(∞) = 0 with Si(0) = 0 to en-
sure interior optima under all circumstances. We will also impose the condition 2S ′′i < S
′′
−i
for i = 1, 2, which restricts the degree of payoff asymmetry between the principals.7
We characterize payoffs both under complete and asymmetric information. Under
asymmetric information, principals ignore the cost parameter θ which is private infor-
mation to the agent. For most of the paper, this parameter is drawn from a uniform
distribution on [θ, θ¯].8 We are interested in the limit of equilibrium payoffs of the asym-
metric information game when the distribution converges towards a Dirac mass at θ.
The common agency game unfolds as follows. First, principals simultaneously and
non-cooperatively offer their nonlinear contribution schedules ti(q) (i = 1, 2) to the agent
who may be privately informed or not depending on whether the game has asymmetric
information or not.9 Second, the agent chooses which contracts to accept. He gets an
exogenous payoff of zero if he refuses all offers. Third, the agent chooses the quantity q(θ)
and receives payments ti(q(θ)) from those principals whose offers are accepted.
Without loss of generality, we restrict each principal’s strategy space to the set of non-
negative contribution schedules, ti(q) ≥ 0; thus, all principals’ offers are accepted by the
agent in equilibrium. Throughout sections 3 to 6, we restrict our attention to equilibria in
which principals offer schedules that are continuous, weakly increasing and differentiable
everywhere except possibly at the maximal output for which ti(q) = 0; at this point there
may be a kink with well-defined left and right derivatives. We call such contribution
schedules smooth or admissible in what follows and refer to such equilibria as either smooth
or admissible. Note that this is not a restriction on strategy spaces, but rather a restriction
7This condition is satisfied when principals have symmetric preferences but also for relatively small
asymmetries as well. It ensures that each equilibrium schedule is concave under adverse selection when
the agent takes both principal’s contracts; an important step to compute the optimal payoff of the agent
if he chooses to contract only with one principal.
8An exception is section 6.2 where the distribution is exponential.
9Following Peters [12] and Martimort and Stole [8], there is indeed no loss of generality in looking at
competition between principals with menus as long as pure strategy equilibria are concerned.
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on the set of equilibria. In section 7, we will discard our smoothness and continuity
requirement and examine non-differentiable equilibria with forcing contracts. For further
references, denote
W12(θ) = max
q≥0
{
2∑
i=1
Si(q)− θq
}
and Wi(θ) = max
q≥0
{Si(q)− θq}
as the greatest payoffs achievable by any coalition involving the agent and either two
principals or only principal i, respectively. By assumptions made on Si(·), those payoffs
are all positive. The optimal outputs for these coalitions are respectively given by the
Lindahl-Samuelson outcome q∗(θ) such that
∑2
i=1 S
′
i(q
∗(θ)) = θ and by the bilaterally
efficient output q∗i (θ) such that S
′
i(q
∗
i (θ)) = θ.
10
3 Complete Information
This section characterizes equilibrium payoffs under complete information assuming dif-
ferentiability of the schedules at the equilibrium point so that the principals’ and the
agent’s best-responses are characterized by first-order conditions. Our main result is that
the whole set of such payoffs can be sustained with truthful schedules.
General Properties: First, we provide a few general properties of equilibria with ad-
missible schedules.
Principal 1’s best-response to an admissible schedule t2(q) offered by principal 2 is a
transfer t1 and an output q together solving:
11
(P1) : max{q,t1}
S1(q)− t1
subject to t1 + t2(q)− θq ≥ max
q˜≥0
{t2(q˜)− θq˜}. (1)
Because t2(q) ≥ 0, the right-hand side of (1) is necessarily nonnegative. The participation
constraint (1) ensures that the agent prefers taking both contracts rather than contracting
only with principal 2 or not participating at all and getting his reservation payoff of zero.
We are interested in equilibria where the principals’ and the agent’s optimal choices
are characterized by first-order conditions. To characterize these equilibria, let us propose
the following definition:
Definition 1 A schedule ti(q) is locally truthful if, at the equilibrium point q(θ), the
principal’s marginal contribution is equal to his marginal valuation:
t′i(q(θ)) = S
′
i(q(θ)).
10Note that q∗(θ) > q∗i (θ) since S
′
−i(·) > 0.
11Provided its solution gives to principal 1 a positive payoff, a condition that will be checked ex post
once we have the full description of equilibrium payoffs.
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The next proposition provides necessary conditions that must be satisfied by any equilib-
rium with admissible schedules.
Proposition 1 In any equilibrium with admissible schedules of the common agency game
under complete information such that the principals’ and the agent’s optimal choices are
characterized by first-order conditions, the following necessary conditions hold:
• The efficient level of public good q∗(θ) is produced;
• There is full extraction of the agent’s rent;
• Contributions schedules are locally truthful:
S ′i(q
∗(θ)) = t′i(q
∗(θ)). (2)
The pair {q∗(θ), t1(q∗(θ))} in the support of principal 1’s best-response is determined
by the solution of (P1). However, many admissible schedules t1(q) may support this out-
come as long as these schedules reflect principal 1’s marginal valuation at the equilibrium
point (condition (2)), i.e., such schedules are locally truthful. Much of our analysis below
focuses on the role of these extensions for out-of equilibrium outputs in characterizing
equilibrium payoffs.
Denote Σ(θ) the set of equilibrium payoff vectors (V1, V2) achieved with admissible
schedules. Consider also the non-empty set Γ(θ)12 of all pairs (V1, V2) satisfying the linear
constraints:
V1 + V2 = W12(θ) (3)
Vi ≥ Wi(θ) for i = 1, 2. (4)
Proposition 2 Under complete information, the set of equilibrium payoffs achieved with
admissible schedules Σ(θ) is such that:
Σ(θ) ⊆ Γ(θ).
From Proposition 1, the equilibrium output is always efficient from the grand-coalition’s
viewpoint and the agent’s rent if fully extracted. The only indeterminacy comes from the
12Non-emptyness is proved in the Appendix.
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distribution of the efficient surplus between principals. To understand the possible lower
bound on any principal’s payoff, observe that one principal, say i, can always deviate and
offer the following admissible schedule:
ti(q) = max{Si(q)−Wi(θ), 0}. (5)
When positive, this truthful schedule perfectly reflects principal i’s marginal valuation
for the public good not only at the equilibrium output but also elsewhere.13 Since it
is non-negative, this schedule is always accepted by the agent whatever principal −i’s
offer. Moreover, when contracting with principal i only, the agent produces an output
q∗i (θ). This yields his stand-alone payoff Wi(θ) to principal i. When contracting also
with principal −i, the agent might increase production above the stand-alone output
q∗i (θ) since, by assumption, t−i(·) is non-decreasing without affecting principal i’s payoff.
Hence, truthful schedules have the attractive property that they always ensure to a given
principal at least his stand-alone payoff.
Truthful Equilibria: We now investigate the set of equilibrium payoffs that can be
sustained with truthful schedules. Let us now suppose that principal 2 offers such a non-
negative truthful schedule: t2(q) = max{S2(q) − V2, 0} where V2 is a constant. Within
principal 1’s best-response correspondence, we may as well select, as suggested by [1], a
truthful schedule which (when positive) reflects principal 1’s preferences, namely t1(q) =
max{S1(q) − V1, 0} for some constant V1. This truthful extension determines also the
reservation payoff that the agent gets when refusing principal i’s contract (see the right-
hand side of (1)).
By definition, the fixed-fees (V1, V2) correspond to the principals’ equilibrium payoffs.
Using the binding participation constraint (1) for principal 1 and a similar condition
coming from computing principal 2’s best-response, these payoffs solve the system:
max
q≥0
{
2∑
i=1
Si(q)− θq
}
−
2∑
i=1
Vi = max
{
0,max
q≥0
{Sj(q)− θq} − Vj
}
, for j = 1, 2. (6)
The left-hand side above is the agent’s payoff when taking both contracts whereas the
right-hand side is his payoff when either not contracting at all or contracting only with
one of the principals.
Denote by ΣT (θ) the set of truthful equilibrium payoffs for the principals. [1, 6,
11 p.319] have shown that solutions to (6) describe in fact the non-empty core of a
cooperative game with a super-additive characteristic function WK(θ) defined for any
subset K ∈ {∅, {1}, {2}, {1, 2}} (using the convention W∅(θ) = 0). This core is described
by the linear constraints (3) and (4) which are obtained when using the definition of
13Note that ti(q) is non-negative, piecewise differentiable and thus admissible.
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WK(θ) in (6). From Proposition 1, full extraction of the agent’s rent under complete
information implies that principals share the aggregate surplus (Eq. (3)). The fact that
the agent prefers taking both contracts to taking only one immediately implies (4).
From (3) and (4), in any truthful equilibrium, principal i gets at most his marginal
contribution to the aggregate surplus of the grand-coalition and at least what he could
gain by standing alone with the agent.
This characterization of ΣT (θ) together with Proposition 2 yields immediately.
Proposition 3 Under complete information, any payoff in Γ(θ) can be implemented as
a truthful equilibrium payoff and thus:
ΣT (θ) = Σ(θ) = Γ(θ).
Focusing on truthful schedules is enough to generate the entire set of equilibrium
payoffs with admissible schedules under complete information. Truthful schedules both
ensure efficiency at the equilibrium point and help each principal to guarantee himself his
stand-alone payoff.
Beyond Truthful Equilibria: One may be interested in characterizing the complete
set of equilibrium payoffs achievable with schedules having a fixed curvature, for instance
linear schedules or, more generally, schedules that are less concave than the truthful ones.
Indeed the concavity of the equilibrium schedules affects how sensitive the agent’s output
choice is to the decision to contract with either one or two principals, i.e., it affects how
much a given principal can request from the agent without inducing him to contract only
with the other principal. In that respect, it is important to understand how moving away
from the truthful schedules may affect the set of equilibrium payoffs.
One such interesting and simple departure is to consider linearized contribution sched-
ules – what we will see is equivalent to Lindahl pricing equilibria. To this end, notice then
that any non-negative equilibrium schedule ti(q) which is concave on its non-negative part
must also satisfy, when ti(q
∗(θ)) > 0:
ti(q) ≤ max{ti(q∗(θ))+t′i(q∗(θ))(q−q∗(θ)), 0} = max{Si(q∗(θ))+S ′i(q∗(θ))(q−q∗(θ))−Vi, 0}.
Consider thus the piecewise linear equilibrium schedules which support the efficient output
and have constant slopes on their positive part defined as:
ti(q) = max{0, Si(q∗(θ)) + S ′i(q∗(θ))(q − q∗(θ))− Vi} (7)
where Vi is again principal i’s payoff at q = q
∗(θ). These schedules are linear around
q∗(θ) and locally truthful. If he accepts both schedules, the agent is indifferent between
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producing any output and may as well produce q∗(θ). These schedules are also best-
responses to each other when, from the binding participation constraint (1) (and a similar
condition coming from principal 2’s best-response), the principals’ payoffs (V1, V2) satisfy:
W12(θ)−
2∑
i=1
Vi =
max
{
0,max
q≥0
{Sj(q∗(θ))− S ′j(q∗(θ))q∗(θ) + (S ′j(q∗(θ))− θ)q − Vj}
}
. (8)
The right-hand sides above achieve maxima at q = 0 since S ′j(q
∗(θ)) < θ for j = 1, 2:
The agent produces nothing if he contracts only with one principal. The unique solution
(V L1 (θ), V
L
2 (θ)) to (8) gives to principals the same payoffs as a non-strategic Lindahl
equilibrium, namely V Li (θ) = Si(q
∗(θ)) − q∗(θ)S ′i(q∗(θ)). The Lindahl payoffs belong to
the core of this public good economy and (V L1 (θ), V
L
2 (θ)) ∈ Σ(θ). Inserting these payoffs
into (7) yields the final expression of the linear Lindahl prices in this strategic environment
as tLi (q) = S
′
i(q
∗(θ))q for all q ≥ 0.
As schedules come closer to the Lindhal prices above, principals become less “strategic”
and end up getting a payoff that corresponds to their rent in the Lindhal equilibrium where
they would adopt a price-taking behavior. Thus, the refinement of Lindahl (i.e., linear)
contribution extensions is appealing both in simplicity and its strategic implications.
4 Asymmetric Information
Turning now to asymmetric information, we assume that the agent knows the value of θ
before contracting with principals. Principals only know that this parameter is uniformly
distributed on [θ, θ¯].
Let Ui(θ) be the agent’s information rent and qi(θ) the corresponding optimal output
when contracting only with principal i:
Ui(θ) = max
q≥0
{ti(q)− θq} and qi(θ) = argmax
q≥0
{ti(q)− θq}
where ti(·) is the nonnegative schedule offered by principal i. We assume for now the
objective function is strictly concave, i.e., that ti(·) is concave on its positive domain.14
Given that admissible contributions are non-negative, we necessarily have Ui(θ) ≥ 0.
Let U(θ) be the agent’s rent when taking both contracts and q(θ) be the corresponding
14Concavity holds for small values of θ¯− θ or, more generally (as we can check below by looking at the
expression of the equilibrium schedules) when 2S′′i < S
′′
−i, as assumed above.
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output:
U(θ) = max
q≥0
{
2∑
i=1
ti(q)− θq
}
and q(θ) = argmax
q≥0
{
2∑
i=1
ti(q)− θq
}
.
Using the Envelope Theorem, we get:
U˙(θ) = −q(θ), (9)
where q(θ) is given by the first-order condition
2∑
i=1
t′i(q(θ)) = θ, (10)
with the second-order condition
q(θ) non-increasing. (11)
Therefore, q(·) is a.e. differentiable with q˙(θ) ≤ 0 at any differentiability point.15
Principal 1’s problem under asymmetric information becomes:16
(P1)
AS : max
{q(·),U(·)}
∫ θ¯
θ
[S1(q(θ)) + t2(q(θ))− θq(θ)− U(θ)] dθ
θ¯ − θ
subject to (9)-(11) and
U(θ) ≥ U2(θ), ∀θ ∈ Θ. (12)
The ex post participation constraints (12) indicate that, whatever his type θ, the agent
should prefer to take both contracts rather than only that offered by principal 2 or, again,
refusing all contracts.17
A priori, solving (P1)
AS is difficult due to the type-dependent participation constraint
(12). Finding this solution is facilitated by making two observations. First, because
contributions are non-negative, the agent is always weakly better off contracting with
both principals. Second, because marginal contributions are also positive, at least when
θ¯− θ is small enough,18 the agent always chooses to produce more when contracting with
both principals than with only one. Hence, t he slope of U(θ) is strictly greater than the
slope of Ui(θ) and (12) binds only at θ¯. We thus have:
U(θ) =
∫ θ¯
θ
q(x)dx+ U2(θ¯). (13)
15Monotonicity, together with (9) (or (10)), is also sufficient for incentive compatibility.
16Implicit in writing this problem is the fact that principal 1 gets a positive payoff when dealing with
any type of the agent, even the worst one. This condition is made explicit in the Appendix.
17This latter option yields zero and is weakly dominated since U2(θ) ≥ 0.
18See Footnote 21 below.
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Taking expectations and integrating by parts, we obtain:∫ θ¯
θ
U(θ)
dθ
θ¯ − θ =
∫ θ¯
θ
(θ¯ − θ)q(θ) dθ
θ¯ − θ + U2(θ¯). (14)
Inserting this expression of the agent’s expected information rent into the maximand
of (P1)
AS and optimizing pointwise with respect to q(θ) yields the necessary first-order
condition satisfied by the equilibrium output qc(θ):19
S ′1(q
c(θ)) + t′2(q
c(θ)) = 2θ − θ. (15)
Summing this condition with a similar one obtained from analyzing principal 2’s best-
response and using the agent’s incentive constraint (10), one finds that the equilibrium
output qc(θ) is the unique solution to:20
2∑
i=1
S ′i(q
c(θ))− θ = 2(θ − θ) ≥ 0. (16)
Because S ′′i (·) < 0, qc(θ) is monotonically decreasing with q˙c(θ) = 3P2
i=1 S
′′
i (q
c(θ))
< 0. Let
denote by θc(q) the inverse function defined over the range [qc(θ¯), qc(θ)]:
θc(q) =
1
3
(
2∑
i=1
S ′i(q) + 2θ
)
.
Finally, using (10) and (15) yields the expression of principal 1’s marginal contribution:21
t′1(q
c(θ)) = S ′1(q
c(θ))− (θ − θ) ∀θ ∈ Θ. (17)
From (17), contributions are not everywhere truthful, i.e., t′1(q) 6= S ′1(q) at any q except
for q = qc(θ). Principal 1’s marginal contribution is less than his marginal valuation for
screening purposes except, of course, for the highest equilibrium output: a standard “no
distortion at the top” result.
Adverse selection rationalizes the use of a nonlinear contribution schedule. Any output
q in the range of qc(·) corresponds to a principal 1’s marginal contribution given by:
t′1(q) = S
′
1(q)− θc(q) + θ =
1
3
(2S ′1(q)− S ′2(q) + θ). (18)
Principal 1’s marginal contribution in any differentiable equilibrium is uniquely defined
by (18). Integrating (18) yields for any equilibrium output q:
t1(q) =
1
3
(2S1(q)− S2(q) + θq)− c1 (19)
19Sufficiency is checked in the Appendix.
20Different equilibrium payoffs may be sustained by varying the fixed-fees in each principal’s schedule
but all these equilibria correspond to the same output qc(θ).
21Note that, for θ¯ − θ small enough, t′1(q) > 0 for any output q in the range of qc(·).
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for some constant c1 as long as this contribution remains positive,
22 i.e., for any equilibrium
output as long as θ¯−θ is small enough. Although equilibrium schedules may differ through
their fixed-fees, they all have the same margin.
The set of possible values of the fixed-fee c1 is determined by the reservation payoff
U2(θ¯) which in turn depends on how t2(q) is extended below the set of equilibrium outputs,
i.e., for q ≤ qc(θ¯). Indeed, only outputs q ≤ qc(θ¯) matter to compute U2(θ¯) since t′1(q) > 0
for all q in the equilibrium range and thus q2(θ¯) ≤ q(θ¯) necessarily. Different extensions
yield different values of U2(θ¯) and may thus generate different divisions of the principals’
equilibrium payoffs.
Our next proposition summarizes the common features of equilibria leaving to section
5 the characterization of equilibrium payoffs in the limit of a small uncertainty. Because
we shall soon be interested in studying the convergence of the equilibrium schedules and
payoffs as θ¯ goes to θ, we make explicit the dependence of the equilibrium schedules on
the upper bound of the type support and denote {ti(q|θ¯)}i∈{1,2} these schedules.
Proposition 4 Assume that θ¯ − θ is sufficiently small and θ is uniformly distributed on
[θ, θ¯].
• At any equilibrium of the common agency game under asymmetric information with ad-
missible schedules, principals offer nonlinear contribution schedules {ti(q|θ¯)}i∈{1,2} which
are not everywhere truthful:
ti(q|θ¯) = 1
3
(2Si(q)− S−i(q) + θq)− ci > 0,∀q ∈ [qc(θ¯), qc(θ)] (20)
• In any such equilibrium, the agent with type θ produces an output qc(θ).
• There is full extraction of the agent’s rent at θ¯. More efficient types get a positive rent.
From (20), one can see that principal 1’s contribution is lower as principal 2’s valuation
increases. Equilibrium contributions reflect now both principals’ preferences. This con-
trasts sharply with the case of complete information where truthful contributions depend
only on own preferences. To understand this point, notice that each principal designs his
own contribution with some concerns on extracting the agent’s information rent. Starting
from the cooperative outcome where principals would share equally the cost of getting
information from the agent, a given principal has an incentive to induce less production to
reduce this rent because he does not fully internalize the cost of underproduction for the
other principal. This results in an excessively low output compared with a cooperative
design of incentives. To induce less production, each principal reduces thus his marginal
22A similar expression is obtained for principal 2.
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contribution below what he would offer under complete information for any equilibrium
output q below qc(θ) = q∗(θ). Formally, we have:
S ′1(q)− t′1(q|θ¯) =
1
3
(S ′1(q) + S
′
2(q)− θ) ∀q ∈ [qc(θ¯), qc(θ)],
≥ 1
3
(S ′1(q
c(θ)) + S ′2(q
c(θ))− θ) = 0.
Principal 1’s marginal contribution is closer to his own marginal valuation when principal
2’s marginal valuation is lower. When principal 2’s preferences are more pronounced,
principal 1 has indeed less incentives to contribute at the margin.
5 Equilibrium Sets and Their Limits
Fix the lower bound θ of the support of the type distribution and let Σ(θ¯, θ) be the set of
principals equilibrium’ payoffs (V AS1 (θ¯), V
AS
2 (θ¯)) in admissible equilibria of the asymmetric
information game when types are uniformly distributed on [θ, θ¯]. We are interested in
describing the limit of the set of equilibrium payoffs as θ¯ converges towards θ.
Proposition 5 Any limit of equilibrium payoffs of the asymmetric information game as
the uniform distribution converges towards a Dirac mass at θ is a truthful payoff. Recip-
rocally, any such payoff is the limit of equilibrium payoffs under asymmetric information:
limθ¯→θΣ(θ¯, θ) = Γ(θ).23
Equilibrium payoffs of the asymmetric information game converge towards complete
information payoffs which are themselves fully described with truthful schedules. Recip-
rocally, when asymmetric information is small enough, one can modify truthful schedules
for off the equilibrium outputs in such a way that equilibrium payoffs under asymmetric
information converge towards any given truthful payoffs. This result does not tell us any-
thing on whether the equilibrium schedules under asymmetric information also converge
towards truthful schedules. To get sharper predictions on the form of equilibrium sched-
ules, we will need to describe in more details their shapes under asymmetric information
and show how this shape may be preserved as one converges towards the complete infor-
mation outcome. This exercice is undertaken in the next section. It allows us to compute
23We define the limit set as
limθ¯→θΣ(θ¯, θ) = {(W1,W2)|∃(W1(θ¯),W2(θ¯)) ∈ Σ(θ¯, θ) such that (W1,W2) = limθ¯→θ(W1(θ¯),W2(θ¯))}.
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the agent’s reservation payoff when contracting with a single principal, an off-the equi-
librium path, and this in turns affects how much each principal can claim from the agent
and the other principal’s equilibrium payoff.
6 Refinements Beyond “Truthfulness”
This section provides more positive results showing that asymmetric information is an
effective device to select equilibrium outcomes when schedules are conveniently extended
under asymmetric information. In both cases investigated below, truthful payoffs are
not all achieved and more stringent selections are obtained when the type distribution
converges towards a Dirac mass at θ.
The basic intuition behind this result is as follows. Remember first that, with truthful
schedules, principals can at most get their incremental contributions to the overall surplus
and get at least their stand-alone payoffs. Suppose that asymmetric information makes
equilibrium schedules become flatter than truthful ones and that this property is preserved
when looking at how equilibrium schedules converge as the distribution becomes closer
to a Dirac. Then, very extreme distributions of the surplus between the principals are no
longer sustained following the logic of section 3.
6.1 Natural-Extension Equilibria
We now specify a “natural” downward extension of the schedules in the asymmetric
information game for q ≤ qc(θ¯) and show that such extension helps refining the set
of equilibrium payoffs. Equation (19) delivers the expression of the contribution only
for equilibrium outputs but its analytic formula can also be used off the equilibrium,
especially for outputs less than qc(θ¯), as long as the non-negativity constraint ti(q) ≥ 0 is
preserved. With such natural extensions, contribution schedules keep track of the incentive
externality that arises under asymmetric information.24
Definition 2 A schedule of the common agency game under asymmetric information for
θ being uniformly distributed on [θ, θ¯] has a natural extension when:25
tNi (q|θ¯) = max
{
1
3
(2Si(q)− S−i(q) + θq)− ci, 0
}
∀q ≥ 0 (21)
24To justify this focus on natural schedules and equilibria, one may think of the principals as insisting
on mechanisms which are robust to perturbations of the information structure. Indeed, if the uniform
distribution of types is extended over an increasingly large support (by increasing θ¯ and keeping θ fixed),
the marginal price given by (18) remains the same and does not depend on the support.
25Again, we make the dependence on the upper bound of the support explicit.
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for some constant ci.
In the limit, as θ¯ converges towards θ (i.e., when one converges towards complete
information at θ), natural-extension contributions are also best-responses to each other
in the complete information game. Their expressions are now given by:
tNi (q) = max
{
1
3
(2Si(q)− S−i(q) + θq) + 1
3
W12(θ)− Vi, 0
}
,∀q for i = 1, 2 (22)
where Vi denotes now principal i’s payoff in the complete information game.
When facing a pair of natural-extension contributions, the agent with type θ still
chooses the efficient output q∗(θ), just as with truthful schedules. Formula (22) shows
that, contrary to truthful equilibria, natural-extension schedules only reflect the prin-
cipals’ preferences at the equilibrium point, and not elsewhere. Indeed, because of the
incentive externality under asymmetric information, natural-extension marginal contribu-
tions are everywhere below the principals’ valuations. For instance, principal 1’s marginal
contribution is S ′1(q) minus an amount
1
3
(S ′1(q)+S
′
2(q)−θ). Since this last term represents
a fraction of marginal welfare which is concave, natural-extension contributions are flatter
below the equilibrium outputs than truthful ones. Following the intuition given at the
beginning of that section, relying on such flat schedules restricts the set of equilibrium
payoffs.
Let denote by ΣN(θ¯, θ) the set of equilibrium payoffs (V1, V2) achieved with natural-
extension schedules under asymmetric information when θ is uniformly distributed on
[θ, θ¯]. The set ΣN(θ) of natural-extension equilibrium payoffs in the complete information
game is defined as the limit of that set when θ¯ converges towards θ:
ΣN(θ) = limθ¯→θΣ
N(θ¯, θ).
Proposition 6 The set of natural-extension equilibrium payoffs is a strict subset of truth-
ful payoffs:
ΣN(θ) $ ΣT (θ).
6.2 Exponential Distribution
Looking now for an even more powerful selection, we build a common agency game under
asymmetric information with equilibrium schedules which are almost linear so that, when
the type distribution converges towards a Dirac mass at θ, the corresponding schedules
and payoffs come close to the linear Lindahl prices and payoffs presented in section 3.
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Consider the case where the agent’s type is distributed on an unbounded interval
[θ,+∞) with an exponential density f(θ) = λ exp(−λ(θ−θ)) and cumulative distribution
F (θ) = 1− exp(−λ(θ− θ)). λ close to zero corresponds to an improper uniform measure
over [θ,+∞) which generalizes the uniform distribution on a bounded support. When λ
goes to infinity, instead, the distribution is closer to a Dirac mass at θ. The benefit of
working with such an unbounded support is that any positive output below q∗(θ) turns out
to be an equilibrium output for some type (may be an arbitrarily large and very unlikely
one however). The drawback is a loss in tractability since equilibrium schedules no longer
have a closed form expression as in section 6.1 although their limits as the distribution
converges towards a Dirac mass can be easily found.
Assume also that both principals are symmetric with S1(q) = S2(q) = S(q). For
further references, let denote by qcλ(θ) the monotonically decreasing solution to
2S ′(qcλ(θ)) = θ +
2
λ
(exp(λ(θ − θ))− 1). (23)
qcλ(θ) is simply the equilibrium output that arises in the common agency game under
asymmetric information. Denote θcλ(q) its inverse. Note that q
c
λ(θ) = q
∗(θ) for all λ and
qcλ(θ) converges towards zero as λ goes to infinity for any θ 6= θ, i.e., as λ goes to +∞.
Proposition 7 Assume that
∫ +∞
θ
qcλ(x)dx < +∞. Then the following properties hold:
• There exists a unique equilibrium of the common agency game under asymmetric infor-
mation. It corresponds to a symmetric contribution tλ(q) which is increasing and concave:
tcλ(q) = S(q)−
1
λ
∫ q
0
(exp(λ(θcλ(x)− θ))− 1)dx, ∀q ∈ [0, qc(θ)]. (24)
• An agent with type θ produces an output qcλ(θ) and gets an information rent U cλ(θ) =∫ +∞
θ
qcλ(x)dx.
With an exponential distribution, any output below q∗(θ) might be chosen in equi-
librium by some type even though it might be with some tiny probability. This pins
down fully the equilibrium schedule and avoids the indeterminacy problem that arose un-
der asymmetric information with a uniform distribution on a bounded interval since the
downward extension was left unspecified. Finally, note that, since equilibrium outputs
can be arbitrarily small, schedules do not specify any positive fee at zero production.
Denote V ASλ the principals’ (common) payoff in that symmetric equilibrium under
asymmetric information for a fixed parameter λ. We are now ready to analyze the limit
of such equilibria as the distribution converges towards a Dirac mass at θ:
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Proposition 8 The following properties hold:
lim
λ→+∞
tcλ(q) = t
L(q) = S ′(q∗(θ))q and lim
λ→+∞
V ASλ = V
L(θ). (25)
Lindahl prices and payoffs emerge as limits of strategic behavior between symmetric
principals when uncertainty on the agent’s type diminishes. Indeed, when the distribution
puts more mass around θ (i.e., when λ increases), it becomes almost optimal to reduce
the output of all (very unlikely) types above θ to zero as it can be seen by passing to
the limit in the right-hand side of (23). To induce any type θ > θ to produce almost
no output whereas type θ produces the first-best amount, an equilibrium schedule in the
asymmetric information game should have a slope close to θ everywhere at least when λ is
large enough. Therefore, the limit of such schedule as the distribution converges towards
a Dirac mass at θ is the symmetric linear Lindahl price stressed in section 3. In the limit,
our procedure selects thus the Lindahl outcome.26
7 Non-Differentiable Equilibria
In this section, we first show that differentiability is key to get efficiency in equilibrium.
Inefficient outcomes can be implemented with forcing contracts which are Nash equilibria.
We characterize below the set of outputs and payoffs for such equilibria. Second, we show
that equilibria with forcing contracts exist also under asymmetric information and that the
whole set of complete information equilibria with forcing contracts is the limit of equilibria
with forcing contracts under asymmetric information as the support of the distribution
shrinks. Hence, the negative results of section 5 carries over to the non-differentiability
case: Asymmetric information again fails to provide a selection device.
7.1 Complete Information
Consider the following non-negative forcing contracts:
tˆi(q) =
{
tˆi ≥ 0 for q = qˆ
0 for q 6= qˆ (26)
26This model with an unbounded support is gives also some rationale for the natural extension of
the schedules seen above for the case of a bounded support distribution. Indeed, note that (23) implies
2S′(qcλ(θ)) ≥ 3θ − 2θ and thus t′λ(q) ≤ tN
′
(q) for all q. Moreover, limλ→0t′λ(q) = t
N ′(q). The slope of
schedules in natural-extension equilibria is thus an upper bound for the slope of the nonlinear schedules
in equilibria corresponding to an exponential distribution with unbounded support. This upper bound
is obtained when the exponential distribution converges towards the improper uniform density function
over [θ,+∞).
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with the added conditions
2∑
i=1
tˆi − θqˆ = 0 ≥ max
i
{tˆi − θqˆ}. (27)
The set of such pairs (tˆ1, tˆ2) is trivially non-empty. When both principals offer such
contracts, the agent accepts both and produces q = qˆ and principal i gets payoff Vi =
Si(qˆ)− tˆi.
Fix any output qˆ such that
2∑
i=1
Si(qˆ)− θqˆ >
2∑
i=1
Wi(θ). (28)
The set of outputs qˆ satisfying (28) contains at least q∗(θ) and it has a non-empty interior
containing inefficient outputs.
Denote Γnd(θ, qˆ) the set of payoff vectors (V1, V2) corresponding to a given output qˆ
satisfying (28) and defined as:
V1 + V2 =
2∑
i=1
Si(qˆ)− θqˆ (29)
Vi ≥ Wi(θ) > Si(qˆ)− θqˆ, i = 1, 2. (30)
Proposition 9 Assume that (28) holds. Γnd(θ, qˆ) is the set of equilibrium payoffs achieved
under complete information with the forcing contracts (26) and the equilibrium output qˆ.
7.2 Asymmetric Information
Consider now the case of asymmetric information with types being uniformly distributed
on a support [θ, θ¯]. Let denote by Σnd(θ¯, θ, qˆ) the set of equilibrium payoffs of the asym-
metric information game achieved with forcing schedules implementing output qˆ. Under
weak conditions on qˆ, any payoff achieved in the complete information game with forcing
schedules implementing qˆ is also the limit of payoffs achieved under asymmetric infor-
mation with forcing schedules implementing the same output qˆ for all types. First, the
fact that Σnd(θ¯, θ, qˆ) is non-empty shows that asymmetric information and the associated
requirement of incentive compatibility do not imply the differentiability of the equilibrium
schedules. Contrary to the case of monopolistic screening environments where the (a.e.)
differentiability of schedules follows from incentive compatibility, that differentiability is
now a modeler’s choice. If one principal offers a forcing non-differentiable contract, there
is no reason to expect that the other principal’s schedule will be differentiable at a best-
response. Second, this result also confirms that asymmetric information does not offer
any bite as a refinement even in the non-differentiable case.
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Proposition 10 Fix any qˆ ≥ max{q∗1(θ), q∗2(θ)} and assume that (28) holds at θ. We
have:
Σnd(θ, qˆ) = limθ¯→θΣ
nd(θ¯, θ, qˆ).
8 Conclusion
We showed that the set of equilibrium payoffs of the delegated common agency game
under complete information that can be achieved when the principals’ and the agent’s
choices are obtained at a differentiability point is entirely described by only considering
equilibria with truthful schedules. The refinement of truthfulness can be replaced by the
weaker requirement of local truthfulness at the equilibrium point only without changing
the description of the equilibrium payoffs and without invalidating the efficiency result.
Asymmetric information can sometimes provide a rationale to select within that set of
truthful payoffs. It has some power as a selection device if one insists on natural-extension
equilibria or if types are exponentially distributed on an infinite support. In both cases,
the limit equilibria obtained as the distribution of types becomes more concentrated is
only a strict subset of all truthful payoffs. Roughly, those limit equilibria correspond to
schedules which are flatter than truthful ones. These extensions make the most extreme
distributions of payoffs between the principals impossible to sustain.
Finally, relaxing the differentiability requirement, inefficient equilibria may be sus-
tained and asymmetric information does not provide any rationale for focusing on differ-
entiable schedules or restrict the equilibrium set either.
Those results on the significant role of the extensions of contribution schedules on
equilibrium characterization and their possible impact for applied works suggest that
more research should be devoted to pin down what are the most relevant conjectures if
one wants to build a robust theory of common agency with some predictive power.
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Appendix
• Proof of Proposition 1: Constraint (1) is necessarily binding at a best-response by
principal 1. Inserting the value of the corresponding optimal transfer t1 into principal 1’s
objective function, and optimizing with respect to output yields the first-order condition
satisfied by the equilibrium output that principal 1 would like to induce:
S ′1(q
∗(θ)) + t′2(q
∗(θ)) = θ. (A1)
A similar condition holds also for principal 2 at a best-response:
S ′2(q
∗(θ)) + t′1(q
∗(θ)) = θ. (A2)
Moreover, the agent chooses optimally the level of output and thus the following first-order
condition holds:
2∑
i=1
t′i(q
∗(θ)) = θ. (A3)
Summing (A1) and (A2) and using (A3) yields efficiency of public good provision.
Using (A1) and (A3) yields also the local truthfulness condition (2)– principals’ mar-
ginal contributions at the equilibrium points are equal to their marginal valuations.
The fact that there is full extraction of the agent’s rent is proven in the following
separate lemma.
Lemma 1 At any equilibrium with admissible schedules, there is full extraction of the
agent’s rent.
Proof: Consider the fictitious cooperative game that is induced by the principals’ equi-
librium contribution schedules and the characteristic function that is simply the agent’s
payoff from contracting with any subset of principals. Specifically, define the character-
istic function as W˜K(θ) = maxq≥0
{∑
i∈K ti(q)− θq
}
for K ∈ {∅, {1}, {2}, {1, 2}} and
where W˜∅(θ) = 0. Observe that W˜K(θ) ≥ 0 for any K since contributions are non-
negative. We first show that this cooperative game is superadditive, which implies con-
vexity in this setting.27 To this end, suppose that q1 ∈ argmaxq≥0 {t1(q)− θq} and
q2 ∈ argmaxq≥0 {t2(q)− θq}, and without loss of generality, suppose that q1 ≥ q2 ≥ 0.
Then, we have
W˜12(θ) ≡ max
q≥0
{t1(q) + t2(q)− θq} ≥ t1(q1) + t2(q1)− θq1 ≥ W˜1(θ) + max
q≥0
{t2(q)− θq}.
27Shapley’s [14] definition of convexity is the requirement that W˜K + W˜K′ ≤ W˜K∪K′ + W˜K∩K′ . In the
present case, it is sufficient to show superadditivity of the characteristic function to prove that the game
is convex: i.e., W˜12(θ) ≥ W˜1(θ) + W˜2(θ).
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The first inequality follows from maximization; the second inequality follows from the
transfer functions being nondecreasing so t2(q1) ≥ t2(q2)− θq2. Hence,
W˜12(θ) ≥
2∑
i=1
W˜i(θ). (A4)
From the fact that (1) is binding at a best-response by either principal, we have
W˜12(θ) = W˜i(θ) for i = 1, 2. (A4) yields thus that W˜12(θ) ≤ 0. Since we have also
0 ≤ W˜12(θ), we finally obtain W˜12(θ) = W˜i(θ) = 0. The agent gets no rent.
• Proof of Proposition 2: Observe that efficiency of the equilibrium output and full
extraction of the agent’s rent at the equilibrium imply:
W12(θ)−
2∑
i=1
Vi = 0 = max
q
{tj(q)− θq} for j = 1, 2. (A5)
Moreover, the fact that t−i(q) is non-negative implies
max
q
Si(q) + t−i(q)− θq ≥ Wi(θ) = max
q
Si(q)− θq. (A6)
Since there is full extraction of the agent’s rent, ti(q
∗(θ))+ t−i(q∗(θ))−θq∗(θ) = 0 and the
left-hand side of (A6) is also principal Pi’s equilibrium payoff Vi = Si(q
∗(θ)) − ti(q∗(θ)).
Therefore, (4) immediately follows.
This immediately yields that any equilibrium payoffs vector (V1, V2) belongs necessarily
to Γ(θ) and Σ(θ) ⊆ Γ(θ).
• Proof of Proposition 3: Clearly, the inclusion ΣT (θ) ⊆ Σ(θ) holds. Reciprocally,
fix any payoff vector (V1, V2) ∈ Γ(θ). The truthful schedules ti(q) = max{0, Si(q) − Vi}
(i = 1, 2) are best-responses to each other and yields those payoffs (V1, V2). Hence, we
have also Γ(θ) ⊆ ΣT (θ) ⊆ Σ(θ).
We just check that Γ(θ) is non-empty.
Lemma 2 The cooperative game with characteristic functionWK(θ) forK ∈ {∅, {1}, {2}, {1, 2}}
is convex and thus Γ(θ) is non-empty.
Proof: The proof of convexity of the game is similar to that of Lemma 1 with Si(·) being
used instead of ti(·).
• Proof of Proposition 4: We solve (P1)AS in the case of small uncertainty, i.e., θ¯ − θ
small enough.
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Lemma 3 U2(·) is non-increasing in θ. Denote q2(θ) = argmaxq≥0{t2(q)− θq}, then:
U˙2(θ) = −q2(θ), (A7)
q2(θ) non-increasing, q˙2(θ) ≤ 0. (A8)
Proof: Standard revealed preferences arguments show that
t2(q2(θ))− θq2(θ) ≥ t2(q2(θ′))− θq2(θ′) and t2(q2(θ′))− θ′q2(θ′) ≥ t2(q2(θ))− θ′q2(θ)
for any pair (θ, θ) with θ > θ′. Summing yields (θ − θ′)(q2(θ)− q2(θ′)) ≤ 0. Hence, q2(θ)
is non-increasing, and thus almost everywhere differentiable. (A7) follows immediately.
That U2(θ) is non-increasing in θ is immediate.
Note that, if t′′2(·) < 0 (a property which holds in equilibrium for equilibrium outputs
and which can be imposed on the extension for any non-negative off equilibrium outputs
as long as the contribution is positive), q2(θ) is given either by the first-order condition:
t′2(q2(θ)) = θ, (A9)
or by the corner solution q2(θ) = 0.
Now, let us turn to the properties of the rent profile U(θ).
Lemma 4 U(·) is non-increasing in θ with
U˙(θ) = −q(θ),
q(θ) non-increasing, q˙(θ) ≤ 0.
Proof: The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3 and is thus omitted.
Because the agent with type θ finds it optimal to choose output q(θ), we have:
2∑
i=1
t′i(q(θ)) = θ. (A10)
Comparing (A9) and (A10), we observe that q(θ) > q2(θ) if t
′
1(·) > 0 for equilibrium
outputs. This monotonicity property of t1(·) will be checked on the equilibrium schedules
found below when θ¯ − θ is small enough.
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Since q(θ) > q2(θ), the participation constraint (12) binds at θ¯ only. We can write
U(θ) =
∫ θ¯
θ
q(x)dx+ U(θ¯), (A11)
where
U(θ¯) = max
q≥0
{
2∑
i=1
ti(q)− θ¯q
}
= U2(θ¯). (A12)
A similar condition would be obtained by looking at principal 2’s best response.
The equilibrium output in (15) is then derived using the argument in the text.
The first-order condition (15) is also sufficient because principal 2’s objective is con-
cave. Indeed S ′′1 (q) + t
′′
2(q) < 0 when t
′
2(q) = S
′
2(q)− θc(q) + θ for any equilibrium output
q in the range of qc(·). This concavity property also holds for off the equilibrium outputs
given that t2(q) is extended conveniently on its positive domain.
Full extraction of the θ¯-agent’s rent: We begin the analysis of the set of equilibrium
payoffs with a Lemma which will be useful in the proof of Proposition 6 below.
Consider the equilibrium strategies defined in (20) and their admissible extensions for
any out of equilibrium output q ≤ qc(θ¯). We have:
Lemma 5 The constants (c1, c2) defined in (20) satisfy the system of linear equations
1
3
(
2∑
i=1
Si(q
c(θ¯)) + 2θqc(θ¯)
)
− θ¯qc(θ¯)−
2∑
i=1
ci = max
i
{
max
0≤q≤qc(θ¯)
{ti(q)− θ¯q}
}
. (A13)
Proof: Equation (A13) is obtained using (A12) for principal 1 and a similar condition
for principal 2. We have by definition:
U(θ¯) = max
q≥0
{
2∑
i=1
ti(q)− θ¯q
}
=
2∑
i=1
ti(q
c(θ¯))− θ¯qc(θ¯).
Using the expressions of the equilibrium contributions at qc(θ¯) from (19) yields:
U(θ¯) =
1
3
(
2∑
i=1
Si(q
c(θ¯)) + 2θqc(θ¯)
)
− θ¯qc(θ¯)−
2∑
i=1
ci. (A14)
When computing Ui(θ¯), we have:
Ui(θ¯) = max
0≤q
{ti(q)− θ¯q} = max
0≤q≤qc(θ¯)
{ti(q)− θ¯q} (A15)
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since for outputs greater than qc(θ¯), we have t′i(q) < t
′
i(q
c(θ¯)) = θ¯ − t′−i(qc(θ¯)) < θ¯ where
the first inequality follows from ti(·) being concave and the second from the definition of
qc(θ¯) and the fact that t′−i(q
c(θ¯)) > 0 when θ¯ is close enough to θ. The equality (A15)
holds for any extension of the equilibrium tariff ti(q) for any out of equilibrium output
q ≤ qc(θ¯). This ends the proof of Lemma 5.
Lemma 6 At any equilibrium with admissible schedules, there is full extraction of the
θ¯-agent’s rent:
U(θ¯) =
1
3
(
2∑
i=1
Si(q
c(θ¯)) + 2θqc(θ¯)
)
− θ¯qc(θ¯)−
2∑
i=1
ci = 0. (A16)
Proof: Consider the fictitious cooperative game with the characteristic function W˜K(θ¯) =
maxq≥0
{∑
i∈K ti(q)− θ¯q
}
for K ∈ {∅, {1}, {2}, {1, 2}} with W˜∅(θ¯) = 0. Note that only
the θ¯ agent’s participation constraint is binding at a best-response for both principals and
that W˜K(θ¯) is superadditive. The rest of the proof follows then exactly that of Lemma 1
and is thus omitted.
This ends the proof of Proposition 4.
• Proof of Proposition 5: First, denote principal i’s equilibrium payoff under asym-
metric information when dealing with the least efficient agent as
V ASi (θ¯|θ¯) = Si(qc(θ¯))− ti(qc(θ¯)|θ¯). (A17)
As we will see below, this payoff is necessarily positive when θ¯ − θ is small enough,
justifying therefore the fact that principal i finds it worth contracting even with the worst
type of the agent (see Footnote 16).
Second, observe that principal i’s expected payoff under asymmetric information and
a uniform distribution on [θ, θ¯] can be defined as:
V ASi (θ¯) =
∫ θ¯
θ
(Si(q
c(θ))− ti(qc(θ)|θ¯)) dθ
θ¯ − θ . (A18)
Using the fact that there is full extraction at θ¯ only, V ASi (θ¯) can be rewritten as
V ASi (θ¯) =
∫ θ¯
θ
(Si(q
c(θ)) + t−i(qc(θ)|θ¯)− (2θ − θ)qc(θ)) dθ
θ¯ − θ . (A19)
Lower bound on equilibrium payoffs: We first determine a lower bound on principal
i’s payoff in any equilibrium. To do so, suppose that this principal contracts alone with
26
the agent. Under this exclusive arrangement, principal i gets an expected payoff which
can be defined as:
V ASEi (θ¯) =
∫ θ¯
θ
(Si(q
E
i (θ))− tEi (qEi (θ)|θ¯))
dθ
θ¯ − θ (A20)
where the optimal output that this principal would implement under asymmetric infor-
mation solves
S ′i(q
E
i (θ)) = 2θ − θ.
Denote ΘEi (q) the inverse of the monotonically strictly decreasing function q
E
i (θ). The
corresponding nonlinear schedule taking into account that the agent with type θ¯ gets zero
rent is such that:
tEi (q|θ¯) = ΘEi (q)q +
∫ θ¯
ΘEi (q)
qEi (x)dx. (A21)
Proceeding as above and using (A20) and (A21) yields a first expression of V ASEi (θ¯)
as
V ASEi (θ¯) =
∫ θ¯
θ
(Si(q
E
i (θ))− (2θ − θ)qEi (θ))
dθ
θ¯ − θ . (A22)
Using (A19), (A22) and the fact that t−i(q|θ¯) is non-negative gives us:
V ASEi (θ¯) ≤
∫ θ¯
θ
(Si(q
E
i (θ)) + t−i(q
E
i (θ)|θ¯)− (2θ − θ)qEi (θ))
dθ
θ¯ − θ ≤ V
AS
i (θ¯). (A23)
This gives a lower bound on principal i’s payoff in the asymmetric information game.
Convergence as θ¯ → θ: Integrating by parts the right-hand side of (A18), we obtain:
V ASi (θ¯) = V
AS
i (θ¯|θ¯)−
∫ θ¯
θ
(S ′i(q
c(θ))− t′i(qc(θ)|θ¯))q˙c(θ)
(
θ − θ
θ¯ − θ
)
dθ.
Taking into account (18), we get:
V ASi (θ¯) = V
AS
i (θ¯|θ¯)−
∫ θ¯
θ
q˙c(θ)(θ − θ)2 dθ
θ¯ − θ . (A24)
Similarly, we have:
V ASEi (θ¯) = V
ASE
i (θ¯|θ¯)−
∫ θ¯
θ
q˙Ei (θ)(θ − θ)2
dθ
θ¯ − θ . (A25)
Since we are interested in the limit of the set of equilibrium payoffs as θ¯ converges towards
θ, note that the second terms on the right-hand sides of both (A24) and (A25) go to zero.
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Turning now to the determination of V ASi (θ¯|θ¯) on the right-hand side of (A24), and
using full extraction at θ¯, (A13) can be rewritten as:
2∑
i=1
Si(q
c(θ¯))− θ¯qc(θ¯)−
2∑
i=1
V ASi (θ¯|θ¯) = 0. (A26)
Also, using (A23) and (A24), we get
V ASi (θ¯|θ¯) ≥ V ASEi (θ¯) +
∫ θ¯
θ
q˙c(θ)(θ − θ)2 dθ
θ¯ − θ . (A27)
As θ¯ converges towards θ, qc(θ¯) converges towards q∗(θ), qEi (θ¯) converges towards q
∗
i (θ)
and V ASEi (θ¯) converges thus towardsWi(θ). Therefore, the set of payoffs (V
AS
1 (θ¯|θ¯), V AS2 (θ¯|θ¯))
satisfying (A26) and (A27) converges towards the set of payoffs (V1, V2) satisfying (3) and
(4). Hence, we have:
limθ¯→θΣ(θ¯, θ) ⊆ Γ(θ).
Reciprocally, fix a payoff vector (V1, V2) ∈ Γ(θ). We construct equilibrium schedules of
the common agency game under asymmetric information with payoffs for the principals
which converge towards (V1, V2) as limits. We distinguish between the cases where (V1, V2)
belongs to the interior of Γ(θ) ((4) is strict for all i) and where it lies on the boundary of
that set. We treat each case in turn.
(V1, V2) belongs to the interior of Γ(θ): Consider the admissible schedules (differentiable
at qc(θ¯)):
ti(q|θ¯) =
{
Si(q)−
∫ q
qc(θ¯)
(θc(x)− θ)dx− V ASi (θ¯|θ¯) if q ≥ qc(θ¯) with θc(q) = θ for q ≥ qc(θ),
max{0, Si(q)− (θ¯ − θ)(q − qc(θ¯))− V ASi (θ¯|θ¯)} if q ≤ qc(θ¯).
(A28)
An agent with type θ¯ chooses qc(θ¯) when taking both contracts and principal i gets a
payoff V ASi (θ¯|θ¯) when contracting with this agent. These schedules also form a Nash
equilibrium of the common agency game under asymmetric information (when θ¯ − θ is
small enough) if there is full extraction of the type θ¯ agent’s surplus. This implies first
that (A26) holds. The pair (V AS1 (θ¯|θ¯), V AS2 (θ¯|θ¯)) such that
V ASi (θ¯|θ¯) = Vi +
1
2
(
2∑
i=1
Si(q
c(θ¯))− θ¯qc(θ¯)−W12(θ)
)
(A29)
satisfies this property. Full extraction implies also that the agent must get a negative
payoff when taking only one contract which implies that V ASi (θ¯|θ¯) must also satisfy:
V ASi (θ¯|θ¯) ≥ max
q≤qc(θ¯)
{Si(q)− (θ¯ − θ)(q − qc(θ¯))− θ¯q}. (A30)
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Using (A29), this means that one must have
Vi ≥ 1
2
(
W12(θ)−
(
2∑
i=1
Si(q
c(θ¯))− θ¯qc(θ¯)
))
+ max
q≤qc(θ¯)
{Si(q)− (θ¯ − θ)(q − qc(θ¯))− θ¯q}.
(A31)
This condition holds for θ¯− θ small enough when Vi > Wi(θ) because the right-hand side
of (A31) converges towards Wi(θ). Turning to (A27), this condition is also satisfied when
V ASi (θ¯|θ¯) is defined by (A29) as θ¯ converges towards θ.
(V1, V2) on the boundary of Γ(θ): Consider now the case where Vi = Wi(θ) for one i (and
thus V−i = W12(θ)−Wi(θ) > W−i(θ)). Consider the following values of (V AS1 (θ¯|θ¯), V AS2 (θ¯|θ¯)):
V ASi (θ¯|θ¯) = max
{
V ASEi (θ¯) +
∫ θ¯
θ
q˙c(θ)(θ − θ)2 dθ
θ¯ − θ ; maxq≤qc(θ¯){Si(q)− (θ¯ − θ)(q − q
c(θ¯))− θ¯q}
}
and
V AS−i (θ¯|θ¯) = −V ASi (θ¯|θ¯) +
2∑
i=1
Si(q
c(θ¯))− θ¯qc(θ¯).
Inserting these values into (A28) gives us a pair of admissible contributions which are
best-responses to each other.
Note that (V ASi (θ¯|θ¯), V AS−i (θ¯|θ¯)) converges towards (Wi(θ),W12(θ) − Wi(θ)) when θ¯
converges towards θ. By definition of (V AS1 (θ¯|θ¯), V AS2 (θ¯|θ¯)) above, conditions (A30) and
(A27) both hold for i by construction and hold for −i when θ¯ − θ is small enough also.
This shows that there exists a sequence of equilibria of the asymmetric information
game whose payoffs for the principals converge again towards (V1, V2).
We finally have always:
Γ(θ) ⊆ limθ¯→θΣ(θ¯, θ).
• Proof of Proposition 6: We start by characterizing payoffs in natural-extension
equilibria of the asymmetric information game, assuming that θ¯ − θ is small enough and
θ is uniformly distributed on [θ, θ¯]. Given the definition of natural-extension schedules in
(21), next lemma provides conditions that the constants (c1, c2) of those schedules must
satisfy in equilibrium.
Lemma 7 The constants (c1, c2) satisfy the following linear constraints:
2∑
i=1
ci = max
q≥0
{
1
3
(
2∑
i=1
Si(q) + 2θq
)
− θ¯q
}
, (A32)
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max
q≥0
{
1
3
(2Si(q)− S−i(q) + θq)− θ¯q
}
≤ ci (A33)
Proof: From (17), we have t′1(q|θ¯) = S ′1(q) + θ − θc(q), for any positive output q at a
natural-extension equilibrium. Thus t′1(q|θ¯) remains positive when θ¯− θ is small enough.
A similar argument holds also for t′2(q|θ¯). Because t′i(q|θ¯) ≥ 0 for i = 1, 2, we can use
Lemmas 5 and 6 to get:
1
3
(
2∑
i=1
Si(q
c(θ¯)) + 2θqc(θ¯)
)
− θ¯qc(θ¯)−
2∑
i=1
ci
= 0 ≥ max
i
{
max
0≤q
{
1
3
(2Si(q)− S−i(q) + θq)− ci − θ¯q
}}
(A34)
which yields (A32) and (A33).
Note first that, when θ¯ converges to θ, (A32) becomes
2∑
i=1
ci =
1
3
max
q≥0
{
2∑
i=1
Si(q)− θq
}
=
1
3
W12(θ). (A35)
Observing that the principals’ payoffs in the complete information game can be written
as Vi = ci +
1
3
W12(θ), (A35) becomes:
2∑
i=1
Vi = W12(θ). (A36)
Let us turn to (A33) when θ¯ converges to θ. Using (A35), it becomes:
ci ≤ 1
3
W12(θ)− 1
3
max
q≥0
{2S−i(q)− Si(q)− 2θq}.
Thus, we get
Vi ≤ 2
3
W12(θ)− 1
3
max
q≥0
{2S−i(q)− Si(q)− 2θq}. (A37)
The claim in Proposition 6 is true whenever the right-hand side of (A37) is strictly
less than W12(θ)−W−i(θ), i.e.:
W12(θ) > −max
q≥0
{2S−i(q)− Si(q)− 2θq}+ 3max
q≥0
{S−i(q)− θq}, for i = 1, 2. (A38)
Take for instance i = 1 and note that:
2∑
i=1
Si(q)− θq + 2S2(q)− S1(q)− 2θq = 3(S2(q)− θq), for all q ≥ 0.
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Hence
W12(θ) + 2S2(q)− S1(q)− 2θq > 3(S2(q)− θq), for all q ≥ 0, q 6= q∗(θ).
In particular, since q∗2(θ) 6= q∗(θ) when S ′1 > 0, we get
W12(θ) + 2S2(q
∗
2(θ))− S1(q∗2(θ))− 2θq∗2(θ) > 3(S2(q∗2(θ))− θq∗2(θ))
which implies (A38).
• Proof of Proposition 7: With an exponential distribution on an infinite support,
principal 1’s problem under asymmetric information becomes:
(P1)
AS : max
{q(·),U(·)}
∫ +∞
θ
[S(q(θ)) + t2(q(θ))− θq(θ)− U(θ)]λ exp(−λ(θ − θ))dθ
subject to (9)-(11) and (12)
where we assume that this principal finds it optimal to contribute whatever the agent’s
type (we show optimality of this strategy below).
Our first step is to replace the participation constraint (12) by a boundary condition.
Lemma 8 When principals offer admissible schedules, the boundary condition
limθ→+∞U(θ) = limθ→+∞U2(θ) (A39)
is equivalent (12).
Proof: U(·) and U2(·) are both monotonically decreasing in θ and non-negative, so that
they have a limit as θ converges towards +∞. Passing to the limit, (12) implies:
limθ→+∞U(θ) ≥ limθ→+∞U2(θ).
Suppose that the inequality is strict, then principal 1 can improve his payoff by reducing
all transfers uniformly by some strictly positive amount , a contradiction with optimality.
Hence, (A39) holds.
Reciprocally, suppose (A39) holds. Because principals offer admissible schedules such
that t′i(q) ≥ 0 for any q ≥ 0, we have also U˙(θ) = −q(θ) ≤ U˙(θ) = −q2(θ) and (A39)
implies (12).
We will thus replace accordingly (12) by (A39) into (P1)
AS to get a new infinite horizon
problem (P1)
AS′ . An admissible pair (U(θ), q(θ)) is one that satisfies (9)-(11) and (A39).
As usual, we neglect the monotonicity condition (11) that will be checked ex post on the
equilibrium output schedule.
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Denote α(θ) the co-state variable for (9). The Hamiltonian of this problem is:
H(α, U, q, θ) = [S(q) + t2(q)− θq − U ]λ exp(−λ(θ − θ))− αq
and its Lagrangian, which is strictly concave in (U, q) as
L(µ, α, U, q, θ) = H(α, U, q, θ) + µ(U − limθ→+∞U2(θ)).
We follow Seierstad and Sydsaeter (1987, Chapter 3, Theorem 12) in writing the necessary
Halkin conditions for optimality as:
S ′1(q(θ)) + t
′
2(q(θ)) = θ +
α(θ)
λ
exp(λ(θ − θ)), (A40)
α˙(θ) = λ exp(−λ(θ − θ)) with α(θ) = 0. (A41)
Denote (U˜(θ), q˜(θ)) the optimal solution satisfying (9), (A39), (A40) and (A41). At the
equilibrium, we will have of course (U˜(θ), q˜(θ)) = (U cλ(θ), q
c
λ(θ)).
From (A41), we also get
α(θ) = 1− exp(−λ(θ − θ)). (A42)
From Seierstad and Sydsaeter [13, Chapter 3, Theorem 13], the necessary conditions
are also sufficient (given the strict concavity of the Lagrangian in (U, q)) if
limθ→+∞α(θ)(U˜(θ)− U(θ)) ≥ 0 (A43)
for any admissible profile U(θ).
Since we have limθ→+∞U(θ) = limθ→+∞U˜(θ) = limθ→+∞U2(θ) and this limit is finite
in equilibrium (see below the condition U˜(θ) = U cλ(θ) =
∫ +∞
θ
qcλ(x)dx < +∞), for any
admissible profile U(θ) and α(θ) < 1, (A43) holds.
Inserting (A42) into (A40) yields:
S ′(q(θ)) + t′2(q(θ)) = θ +
1
λ
(exp(λ(θ − θ))− 1), (A44)
Adding up (A44) and a similar equation obtained by looking at principal 2’s best-response
yields (23). Note that limθ→+∞qcλ(θ) = 0.
Still using (A44), we finally get the symmetric expression of the marginal contributions
of both principals as:
t′i(q) = t
′(q) = S ′(q)− 1
λ
(exp(λ(θcλ(q)− θ))− 1).
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Denote the equilibrium schedules as ti(q) = S(q) −
∫ q
0
1
λ
(exp(λ(θcλ(x) − θ)) − 1)dx − Vi.
Using (A39) at the equilibrium, we find:
limθ→+∞
{
max
q≥0
2S(q)− θq − 2
∫ q
0
1
λ
(exp(λ(θcλ(x)− θ))− 1)dx−
2∑
i=1
Vi
}
= 0
≥ limθ→+∞
{
max
q≥0
S(q)− θq −
∫ q
0
1
λ
(exp(λ(θcλ(x)− θ))− 1)dx− Vi
}
for i = 1, 2.
(A45)
Note that maxq≥0 2S(q) − θq − 2
∫ q
0
1
λ
(exp(λ(θcλ(x) − θ)) − 1)dx = 2S(qcλ(θ)) − θqcλ(θ) −
2
∫ qcλ(θ)
0
1
λ
(exp(λ(θcλ(x) − θ)) − 1)dx and denote ϕ(θ) this expression. We have ϕ˙(θ) =
−qcλ(θ) < 0 and ϕ(θ) ≥ 0 so that limθ→+∞ϕ(θ) exists. Given that limθ→+∞qcλ(θ) = 0
and S(0) = 0 by assumption, this limit is necessarily zero. Moreover the max on the
right-hand side of (A45) is achieved for a positive output q
′
λ(θ) defined as S
′(q
′
λ(θ)) =
θ+ 1
λ
(exp(λ(θcλ(q
′
λ(θ))− θ)). Denote ϕ′(θ) = maxq≥0 S(q)− θq−
∫ q
0
1
λ
(exp(λ(θcλ(x)− θ))−
1)dx = S(q
′
λ(θ))−θq′λ(θ)−
∫ q′λ(θ)
0
1
λ
(exp(λ(θcλ(x)−θ))−1)dx. We have ϕ˙′(θ) = −q′λ(θ) < 0
and ϕ′(θ) ≥ 0 so that limθ→+∞ϕ′(θ) exists. Given that limθ→+∞q′λ(θ) = 0 and S(0) = 0
by assumption, this limit is necessarily again zero. Inserting those findings into (A45)
yields immediately V1 = V2 = 0.
Moreover, since by assumption
∫ +∞
θ
qcλ(x)dx < +∞, the agent’s rent can be written
as U cλ(θ) =
∫ +∞
θ
qcλ(x)dx. Then, note that the net surplus that each principal withdraws
from contracting with any type θ is φ(θ) = 2S(qcλ(θ)) − θqcλ(θ) −
∫ qcλ(θ)
0
1
λ
(exp(λ(θcλ(x) −
θ)) − 1)dx − ∫ +∞
θ
qcλ(x)dx with φ˙(θ) =
q˙cλ(θ)
λ
(exp(λ(θ − θ)) − 1) < 0 so that φ(θ) is
decreasing and φ(θ) = ϕ(θ) +
∫ qcλ(θ)
0
1
λ
(exp(λ(θcλ(x) − θ)) − 1)dx −
∫ +∞
θ
qcλ(x)dx. Since
limθ→+∞qcλ(θ) = limθ→+∞ϕ(θ) = limθ→+∞
∫ +∞
θ
qcλ(x)dx = 0, we have limθ→+∞φ(θ) = 0.
Hence, φ(θ) is positive and it is worth for each principal to contract with any type.
• Proof of Proposition 8: Fix any q ≥ 0. First observe that t′λ(q) = θ
c
λ(q)
2
and
θcλ(q)− θ =
1
λ
log(2S ′(q)− θcλ(q)) +
log(λ)
λ
≈λ→+∞ log(λ)
λ
.
Hence,
limλ→+∞θcλ(q) = θ = 2S
′(q∗(θ)).
This yields the result in the text.
• Proof of Proposition 9: By deviating and inducing another output q 6= qˆ, the best
that principal i can do is to offer a contract which extracts the agent’s rent and makes him
produce q∗i (θ) = argmaxq≥0 Si(q)− θq. Principal i gets Wi(θ) with such a deviation. The
agent prefers to take this new offer and getting nothing from principal −i than producing
qˆ since 0 ≥ tˆ−i − θqˆ when (27) holds. Hence, the deviation is non-profitable when:
Vi ≥ Wi(θ)
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from which we derive immediately that principal i’s payoff is non-negative. From (27),
the principals’ payoffs (V1, V2) must also satisfy:
2∑
i=1
Si(qˆ)− θqˆ −
2∑
i=1
Vi = 0 ≥ max
i
{Si(qˆ)− θqˆ − Vi}.
This completes the characterization of payoffs with forcing contracts under complete in-
formation given in (29) and (30).
• Proof of Proposition 10: Suppose that principal 2 offers a forcing contract tˆ2(q) ={
tˆ2 ≥ 0 for q = qˆ
0 for q 6= qˆ . We want to prove that a best-response to that forcing contract is
also a forcing contract tˆ1(q) =
{
tˆ1 ≥ 0 for q = qˆ
0 for q 6= qˆ even under asymmetric information,
when θ¯ is close enough to θ.
Consider a deviation by principal 1 to a schedule t1(q) that would implement an output
q(θ) ≤ qˆ for all θ under asymmetric information. The best of such deviations solves (P1)AS
with the participation constraint (12) being now expressed as:
U(θ) ≥ U2(θ) = max{0, tˆ2 − θqˆ}, ∀θ ∈ Θ. (A46)
Assuming that U2(θ) = 0 for all θ (we come back on this assertion below), the solu-
tion is straightforward. It entails a monotonically decreasing output qE1 (θ) such that
S ′1(q
E
1 (θ)) = 2θ − θ and qE1 (θ) ≤ q∗1(θ) < qˆ by assumption. Principal 1’s expected pay-
off for that deviation is V ASE1 (θ¯) =
∫ θ¯
θ
(
S1(q
E
1 (θ))− (2θ − θ) qE1 (θ)
)
dθ
θ¯−θ which converges
towards W1(θ) from below when θ¯ converges towards θ.
Consider now a deviation by principal 1 to a schedule that would induce an output
q(θ) such that q(θ∗) ≥ qˆ for some θ∗. Because q(θ) must be non-increasing, this deviation
satisfies q(θ) ≥ qˆ for all θ ≤ θ∗ and we may define θ∗ such that q(θ) ≤ qˆ for θ ∈ [θ∗, θ¯]. Since
qE1 (θ) ≤ q∗1(θ) ≤ q∗1(θ) < qˆ by assumption, since principal 1’s objective function under
asymmetric information is concave and maximized pointwise at qE1 (θ), and since tˆ2 ≥ 0 the
best of such deviations by principal 1 has necessarily q(θ) = qˆ for all θ ≤ θ∗. Principal 2’s
forcing contract is also taken by the agent with type θ ≤ θ∗. Denote tˆ1 the corresponding
fixed payment on that interval. Principal 1 gets payoff
∫ θ∗
θ
(S1(qˆ)− tˆ1) dθθ¯−θ on that interval.
Types θ ∈ [θ∗, θ¯] do not take principal 2’s contract for the best of such deviations and they
receive the best exclusive option that principal 1 can offer, i.e., a contract that implements
qE1 (θ) and yields to that principal an expected profit
∫ θ¯
θ∗
(
S1(q
E
1 (θ))− (2θ − θ) qE1 (θ)
)
dθ
θ¯−θ
on that interval. Moreover, the agent’s rent is continuous at type θ∗ so that:
tˆ1 + tˆ2 − θ∗qˆ =
∫ θ¯
θ∗
qE(x)dx.
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Taking into account this expression, the optimal cut-off θ∗ chosen at a best-response by
principal 1 is defined as the solution to the following optimization problem
max
θ∗∈Θ
∫ θ∗
θ
(
S1(qˆ) + tˆ2 − θ∗qˆ −
∫ θ¯
θ∗
qE(x)dx
)
dθ
θ¯ − θ+
∫ θ¯
θ∗
(
S1(q
E
1 (θ))− (2θ − θ) qE1 (θ)
) dθ
θ¯ − θ .
The derivative of that maximand is positive at θ∗ = θ¯, i.e., all types choose the contract
(tˆ1, qˆ), when:
S1(qˆ) + tˆ2 ≥ (2θ¯ − θ)qˆ + S1(qE1 (θ¯))− (3θ¯ − 2θ)qE1 (θ¯). (A47)
Note that this optimality condition implies also that principal 1’s payoff is greater when
inducing all types to choose a forcing contract than to deviate and deal exclusively with
him (choosing θ∗ = θ), i.e., S1(qˆ) − tˆ1 ≥ V ASE1 (θ¯). A condition similar to (A47) follows
from computing principal 2’s best-response:
S2(qˆ) + tˆ1 ≥ (2θ¯ − θ)qˆ + S2(qE2 (θ¯))− (3θ¯ − 2θ)qE2 (θ¯). (A48)
To induce all types to choose the forcing contracts (tˆ1, qˆ) and (tˆ2, qˆ), equilibrium
transfers must finally satisfy:
tˆ1 + tˆ2 = θ¯qˆ. (A49)
Using equations (A47), (A48) and (A49), an equilibrium with forcing contracts induc-
ing production qˆ by all types is such that:
2∑
i=1
Si(qˆ)− θ¯qˆ ≥ 2(θ¯ − θ)qˆ +
2∑
i=1
Si(q
E
i (θ¯))− (3θ¯ − 2θ)qEi (θ¯). (A50)
When θ¯ converges towards θ, the left-hand side converges towards
∑2
i=1 Si(qˆ)−θqˆ whereas
the right-hand side converges towards
∑2
i=1Wi(θ). Therefore, (A50) holds when θ¯ is close
enough to θ since we have assumed that (28) is satisfied. Hence, for θ¯ − θ close enough
to zero, there exists (tˆ1, tˆ2) that satisfy conditions (A47) to (A49) and hold the pair
of forcing contracts as an equilibrium of the common agency game under asymmetric
information. In particular, using (A48) and (A49) we get, for any θ, tˆ2 − θqˆ ≤ tˆ2 − θqˆ ≤
S2(qˆ)− θ¯qˆ − (S2(qE2 (θ¯))− (3θ¯ − 2θ)qE2 (θ¯)) which is negative for θ¯ − θ small enough since
it converges towards S2(qˆ) − θqˆ −W2(θ) < 0. This validates the way we solved (P1)AS
above since U2(θ) = 0 for all θ when θ¯ − θ is small enough.
Rewriting equations (A47), (A48) and (A49) in terms of the principals’ payoffs (V1(θ¯), V2(θ¯))
in that forcing equilibrium under asymmetric information, we obtain respectively:
Vi(θ¯) = Si(qˆ)− tˆi ≥ (θ¯ − θ)qˆ + Si(qEi (θ¯))− (3θ¯ − 2θ)qEi (θ¯), i = 1, 2, (A51)
V1(θ¯) + V2(θ¯) =
2∑
i=1
Si(qˆ)− θ¯qˆ. (A52)
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Finally, the set Σnd(θ¯, θ, qˆ) of payoffs of the asymmetric information game (V1(θ¯), V2(θ¯))
satisfying (A51) and (A52) is such that:
limθ¯→θΣ
nd(θ¯, θ, qˆ) ⊆ Σnd(θ, qˆ).
Reciprocally, consider a pair of forcing contracts {tˆ1(q), tˆ2(q)} as in (26) that is an
equilibrium under complete information at θ = θ and yields payoffs (V1, V2) in Σ
nd(θ, qˆ).
Suppose first that Vi > Wi(θ) for i = 1, 2. Define the following payoffs
Vi(θ¯) = Vi − 1
2
(θ¯ − θ)qˆ.
These are equilibrium payoffs with forcing contracts under asymmetric information when
(A51) and (A52) hold. The corresponding transfers tˆi(θ¯) = Si(qˆ)−Vi(θ¯) satisfy then (A47),
(A48) and (A49). Note that, by construction, (V1(θ¯), V2(θ¯)) satisfy (A52). Moreover, since
Vi > Wi(θ), since Vi(θ¯) converges towards Vi as θ¯ goes to θ and since the right-hand side
of (A51) converges towards Wi(θ), Vi(θ¯) satisfies (A51) when θ¯ − θ is small enough.
Consider now the case where Vi = Wi(θ) for either i = 1 or 2. Then, by construction,
V−i =
∑2
i=1 Si(qˆ) − θqˆ −Wi(θ). Let Vi(θ¯) = (θ¯ − θ)qˆ + Si(qEi (θ¯)) − (3θ¯ − 2θ)qEi (θ¯) and
V−i(θ¯) =
∑2
i=1 Si(qˆ)− θ¯qˆ − Vi(θ¯). (V1(θ¯), V2(θ¯)) converges towards (V1, V2) as θ¯ − θ goes
to zero. By construction, Vi(θ¯) satisfies (A51) and V−i(θ¯) satisfies a similar inequality
for θ¯ − θ small enough. Indeed, the right-hand side of (A51) for subscript −i converges
towardsW−i(θ) and V−i(θ¯) converges towards
∑2
i=1 Si(qˆ)−θqˆ−Wi(θ) > W−i(θ) when (28)
holds at θ. Hence, (V1(θ¯), V2(θ¯)) is a vector of principals’ payoffs in a forcing equilibrium
of the asymmetric information game and we have:
Σnd(θ, qˆ) ⊆ limθ¯→θΣnd(θ¯, θ, qˆ).
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